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Abstract 
Electricity wholesale markets are undergoing rapid transformation due to the increasing share of 
distributed and variable renewable energy sources (vRES) penetrating the market. The increasing 
shares of stochastic wind generation bring along greater deviations between the real time power 
generation and the day-ahead forecasts of power supply. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
trading activity is shifting more from the traditionally dominant day-ahead market into the intra-
day and regulating power markets. This is because predicting vRES power generation closer to the 
actual delivery is more reliable and because power generators are motivated to avoid high 
imbalance costs. We study price spreads between day-ahead, intra-day and regulating power 
markets in three Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) during 2013-2017. We estimate 
vector autoregressive (VAR) models to study the interrelationships between the price spreads and 
the effects of wind forecast and demand forecast errors, and other exogenous variables, such as 
transmission congestions, and hydrological conditions, on price spreads in different Nord Pool 
bidding areas. We use the variation in the shares of wind power between bidding areas to analyse 
the impacts of increased shares of wind power on different market places. We find that wind 
forecast errors do affect price spreads in areas with large shares of wind power generation. 
Moreover, demand forecast errors have an impact on almost all price spreads, except in areas with 
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I. Introduction 
Electricity wholesale markets are undergoing rapid transformation due to the increasing share of 
distributed and variable renewable energy sources (vRES) penetrating the market traditionally 
dominated by centralized and dispatchable generation. After electricity market liberalization and 
ownership unbundling in Europe, the most relevant market place with respect to volume, liquidity 
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and efficiency has been the day-ahead market. However, the increasing shares of stochastic wind 
generation bring along greater deviations between the real time power generation and the day-
ahead forecasts of power supply. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that trading activity is shifting 
more into the intra-day and balancing markets, because it is more reliable to predict the actual 
power generation of vRES closer to power delivery and thus avoiding high imbalance costs.  
Ongoing institutional changes are also promoting the usage of closer-to-delivery markets, such as 
shorter gate-closer time, higher resolution for imbalance settlement (from 60 minutes to 15 
minutes), and more granular tradable products (15 and 30 minutes). Unique to the Nordic 
electricity market is the design of the regulating power market (and its imbalance settlement 
mechanism), which is a market that allows power generators and demand side to offer flexibility 
to the transmission system operators (TSOs) close to the actual delivery. Compared to the most of 
Continental Europe, the Nordic electricity market follows dual imbalance pricing, where 
consumption and production imbalances are treated differently, depending on the deviation 
direction of the control area. Because of this particular design as well as relatively low imbalance 
prices due to the innate flexibility of the Nordic hydro-dominated power system, the incentives to 
use intraday or regulating power market are different than in the more studied regions, such as 
Germany. 
From the brief discussion above a question arises, how relevant each electricity market place is 
with the increasing share of vRES? Is the dominating position of day-ahead market diminishing 
and the markets closer to real time start dominating the trading activity and price discovery? 
Reliable understanding of the market dynamics is critical because investments into new power 
generation, real-time pricing, and price-risk hedging strategies are often based on the day-ahead 
market. In this study we therefore investigate the trading behaviour and price discovery of the 
Nordic day-ahead, intra-day and regulating power markets during 2013-2017. We further narrow 
down the geographical scope of our study to three countries with the greatest increase in wind 
power, which are Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.  
The current energy transition towards emission-free energy system has initiated deep changes in 
the Nordic countries’ generation mix with implications for flexibility. Three trends contribute to 
less flexibility in the Nordic power generation: growth in intermittent generation, less flexible 
thermal generation, and surplus generation in the years with normal precipitation (Norden, 2014). 
In this study we particularly focus on the impacts of intermittent wind power generation, which 
has been rapidly penetrating the Nordic markets and which has direct implications for the costs of 
power system balancing, among others. The deployment of vRES in the Nordic countries also 
differs. In 2017, Denmark produced over 40 percent of total power production by wind, whereas 
Sweden and Finland produced 12 and 5 percent, respectively. In this study we find that in areas 
with more wind power generation, wind forecast errors cause prices to differ between market 
places.  
Specifically, we utilize price spreads between day-ahead, intra-day and regulating power market 
prices and run vector autoregressive (VAR) models to study the interrelationships between these 
price spreads. Nordic electricity market is divided in number of different bidding areas2, each 
having a different amount of wind power capacity installed. We use this variation when analysing 
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impacts of increased wind power. We further control for fundamental variables, such as demand 
forecast errors, transmission congestions, and hydrological conditions. 
Using the pairwise spreads between market places enables us to clearly disentangle the price 
dynamics between all wholesale electricity market places. This is in contrast to previous studies 
that either use only a single spread and assume the dynamics of the rest, such as (Karanfil and Li 
2017), or studies that calculate a combined spread out of multiple market prices and price 
components, which impedes clear understanding of its fundamental drivers, such as (Batalla-
Bejerano & Baute-Trojillo, 2016) In addition, VAR models are well suited for forecasting, 
therefore our method can bring highly valuable information for market participants, who want to 
estimate the underlying risk between market places. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section II we lay down the foundations of the Nordic 
electricity wholesale markets, explain the unique Nordic imbalance settlement mechanism, and 
outline details of the Nordic power generation mix. In section III we review relevant literature, 
which is followed by data description in section IV. We discuss the main findings based on 
Granger-causality tests and impulse response functions in section VI, and conclude the work in 
section VII. 
II. Market places – institutional setup 
In this section we first lay down the foundations of the individual market places in the Nordic 
electricity wholesale markets (subsection A), followed by a subsection B on explaining the 
imbalance settlement, which is influential in determining the trading strategies in the day-ahead, 
intraday and also regulating power markets. The section ends by an overview of the Nordic 
electricity mix in subsection C. 
A. Nordic electricity wholesale markets 
The Nordic electricity wholesale market is a liberalised and unbundled market that can be divided 
into financial and physical markets3. In this paper we focus on the physical market, which 
comprises of day-ahead, intra-day, and regulating markets. In general, the main reason for the 
existence of different electricity wholesale markets is to efficiently and effectively balance the 
electrical power system both in the short-run (least cost economic dispatch) and long-run 
(investments). According to the European electricity target model, market participants (generators, 
consumers, retailers, and traders) in the physical markets are responsible in their balance between 
electricity procurement/use or production/sales. However, as small actors are not capable to handle 
real-time balance by themselves, they can “outsource” this responsibility to server providers (e.g. 
electricity retailers) by open supply contracts. Market parties, of which open supplier is TSO, are 
called balance responsible parties (BRP). BRPs in the Nordic market currently submit their 
generation and/or consumption schedules to transmission system operators (TSOs) in time steps 
(trading period) of 60 minutes. However, according to the guideline on electricity balancing 
(EBGL) established by the EU Commission regulation (2017/2195), the time steps of schedules, 
called imbalance settlement period (ISP), are to be harmonized into 15 minutes. This is planned to 
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be implemented first for the intraday and balancing markets, followed by the day-ahead. The 
difference between schedules and final positions is called imbalance, and in order to avoid the 
associated imbalance costs (more details below on balancing market), BRPs typically aim for a 
balanced portfolio via physical dispatch and trade (via exchange, broker or bilateral trade). See 
Figure 1 for overview of the Nordic electricity wholesale markets. 
 
Figure 1 Overview of the Nordic electricity wholesale markets 
Day-ahead market 
The first and historically most important (volume and liquidity) wholesale electricity market is the 
day-ahead market (Elspot) operated by Nord Pool in Nordic countries. Elspot follows a uniform 
price periodic double auction in which buyers and sellers submit their bids4 by 12:00 CET day 
before delivery for each hour of the following day. Market participants receive information about 
the binding trading transmission capacities available for the day-ahead auction at 10:00 CET from 
Nord Pool, i.e. 2 hours before the gate-closure. The day-ahead prices are published shortly after 
the auction closes, which gives market participants information about the next day’s hourly prices 
12 hours ahead of the first delivery hour (00:00-00:59 day-ahead) up to 36 hours before the last 
delivery hour (23:00-23:59 day ahead).  The intersection of the aggregated supply and demand 
curves provides the equilibrium hourly price for the entire Nordic electricity market, also known 
as the system price. The system price works as a price reference for congestion-free grid on an 
hour-by-hour basis.  
In addition to electricity, also cross-border transmission capacity is implicitly auctioned in the day-
ahead market. This is part of a congestion management technique called zonal pricing. Instead of 
pricing the day-ahead transmission capacity explicitly, the market is split into predefined 
geographical regions that decouple from the reference system price into area prices (currently 16) 
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when the cross-border transmission, allocated by TSOs on a daily basis, reaches its limits. Even 
though the policy goal is to have an integrated electricity price across the region, area prices exist 
to reflect transmission scarcity between bidding areas, and to alleviate long-term transmission 
bottlenecks. To deal with short-term bottlenecks within the bidding areas, TSOs can, at their 
request and expense, order redispatch of the regional distribution of power plant production that 
resulted from the day-ahead market auction. Redispatching, also called countertrading, is priced 
according to pay-as-bid principle, in contrast to the uniform price in the day-ahead market. For 
discussion about possible inefficiencies between different auction designs and congestion 
management techniques, see (Holmberg & Lazarcyk, 2015). 
Intraday market 
Once the day-ahead market is closed, intraday market Elbas continues trading up to 1 hour prior 
to delivery hour to allow market participants address errors in their demand and supply forecasts. 
Elbas is a joint intraday market of the Nordic (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark), Baltic 
(Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia), and Continental (the Netherlands, Belgium, and an alternative to 
EPEX Intraday in Germany) markets. Market participants can begin trading on Elbas from 14:00 
CET the day before delivery.  Elbas market follows continuous pay-as-bid double auction5, where 
limit orders form an order book of bids and asks sorted by price and time of offer, similarly as in 
equity markets. Capacity allocation and energy matching processes are done simultaneously, 
which means that the local order book views take into account capacities that are allocated by 
different TSOs on each border. The initial Elbas transmission capacity for the next day is given 
after the Elspot auction is settled, normally around 14:00 CET. The initial Elbas transmission 
capacities may change during the day of operation, but trades already agreed are guaranteed 
(Energinet, 2011). Therefore, market participants possess the initial information about the planned 
transmission capacities available for Elbas trade across bidding areas 10 hours ahead of the first 
delivery hour (00:00-00:59 day-ahead) and up to 34 hours ahead of the last delivery hour (23:00-
23:59 day-ahead). Cross-border trades will only be possible if there is enough allocated capacity 
between the areas. Figure 12 in the Appendix shows the Elbas volume trades among bidding areas 
during 2012-2017. The figure highlights, among others, the effect of congestion, as shown by the 
example of Finland, which buys most of its intraday volume from its own area.  
Currently, Elbas offers trading of 15 minutes, 30 minutes, hourly and block products. The sub-
hourly products have been introduced only recently in the Nordic market and are out of scope of 
our time-horizon (2013-2017). Nonetheless, it has been shown that the introduction of 15 minute 
intraday contracts in Germany has increased the limited liquidity typically associated with intraday 
markets (Henriot, 2012; Neuhoff, Ritter, Salah-Abou-El-Enien, & Vassilopoulos, 2016). Because 
of high variability and lower predictability of wind speed resources, particularly wind generation 
benefits from shorter, sub-hourly contracts.  
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Regulating power market 
Each balance responsible party (BRP) must maintain a continuous power balance between its 
electricity production/procurement and consumption/sales. TSOs are obliged to keep power 
balance during every second, which is manifested by a stable network frequency of 50 Hz. Because 
production/consumption plans often deviate from their actual values, and bottlenecks, incidents 
and disturbances do occur during the operation hour, TSOs are procuring balancing products, 
which ensure power system balance.  
Balancing market can be generally divided into reserve market and regulating market. Reserve 
market is divided into three categories mostly determined by their activation time: primary, 
secondary, and tertiary, which are in the current terminology called Frequency Containment 
Reserve (FCR), Automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve (aFRR), and Manual Frequency 
Restoration Reserve (mFRR), respectively. In this paper we focus on the Manual Frequency 
Restoration Reserve (mFRR). 
TSOs maintain Manual Frequency Restoration Reserves to cover the dimensioning fault6 in their 
own area. The Nordic TSOs own or lease back-up generating plants as part of mFRR capacity, 
however, the main source of balancing mFRR energy comes from the joined Nordic balancing 
energy market. This market is also called regulating power market. 
Regulating power market follows a uniform price auction jointly operated by all the Nordic TSOs 
with a common merit order exchanged via a common platform called Nordic Operational 
Information System (NOIS). Market participants can submit their bids for up- or/and down-
regulation to the local TSO from afternoon the day-before until 45 minutes before the delivery 
hour. TSOs order up- or down-regulation from the regulating energy market according to the 
power system requirements, where up-regulation means increasing production or reducing 
consumption, and down-regulation means reducing production or increasing consumption.  
Each delivery hour is declared as up-, down-, or no-regulation, depending on the sum of activated 
bids on the NOIS. In the up-regulation state the TSO is buying power from the bidders and in the 
down-regulation state the TSO is selling power to the bidders, so depending on the need, either the 
least expensive up-regulating bid or the best paying down-regulating bid sets the regulating power 
price that each activated bid receives. There is a link between the day-ahead price and the 
regulating power price in such a way that the day-ahead price sets the floor for the up-regulation 
price and the cap for the down-regulation price, and consequently for the imbalance prices. Each 
up-regulation bid has to contain information about the maximum up-regulation capacity (MW) 
and minimal price (€/MWh), and equally each down-regulation bid has to include maximum 
down-regulation capacity (MW) and maximum price (€/MWh). Balancing energy bids may be 
given for all resources that can carry out a 10 MW change of power in 15 minutes (5 MW if using 
electronic activation), and the bids can be aggregated from multiple sources. 
The regulating price is identical in all electricity bidding areas provided that no bottlenecks exist 
during the delivery hour. Hence, it is not the local demand that determines the direction of the 
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regulation, but the aggregated net regulation carried out in the Nordic area. If bottlenecks between 
bidding areas in the delivery hour exist, the direction of the regulation may not be the same in all 
the areas (Energinet, 2017). The hourly sum of the regulation offers given by local market parties 
to the regulating power market is published hourly with one hour delay, e.g. information from hour 
09-10 is published at 11 o'clock. Note that national TSOs are the single buyers of regulating power 
in the Nordic market. 
B. Imbalance settlement 
The regulating energy prices also serve as the basis for pricing imbalance power, which arises due 
to the difference between physical positions and final schedules (including regulating bids) all 
reported at the latest 45 minutes before the beginning of the specific hour. After the delivery hour, 
deviations between the activated load and production balance responsible bids, and the actual 
amount of electricity provided/utilised, are determined.  Local TSOs serve as open suppliers for 
the BRPs that are obliged to buy or sell these imbalances from/to the TSO. The institution 
responsible for imbalance settlement in Norway, Finland and Sweden is called eSett, and 
Denmark’s system operator Energinet settles the imbalances by itself. The final settlement of 
imbalances is made day after the delivery.  
In general, market players have two choices to close open positions close to the real time, either 
through the intraday market or by adjusting generation or loads. They typically strive for a 
balanced portfolio and thus actively trade before the delivery hour to avoid the cost of imbalances 
(Pogosjan & Winberg, 2013). It is worth pointing out two important features of the Nordic 
balancing market that influence the decision about which market to use for balancing. First, a so-
called proactive balancing philosophy is practiced in the Nordic electricity market (Energinet, 
2018). This means that during the delivery hour, TSOs foresee the imbalances and procure and 
activate the necessary regulating power reserves. This is in contrast to a reactive balancing 
philosophy, applied for instance in Germany, where each market player balances its position close 
to real time and the TSO’s automatic and fast reserves play a more important role. This is why we 
may expect differences in market place usage between the German7 and the Nordic markets, 
because the Nordic regulating market plays a much more important role in the proactive balancing 
approach. This is why the intraday market has historically played a less important role in the 
Nordic countries, because the (flexible) market participants can sell their imbalances as up- or 
down regulation on the regulating power market close to operation (Energinet, 2018). Furthermore, 
because of the abundance of flexible hydro production in the Nordic region the risks of facing 
large imbalance costs have been relatively low which disincentivises the usage of the intraday 
market. 
The second distinct feature of the Nordic balancing market is the design of the imbalance 
settlement mechanism, which applies two different pricing systems for production (two-price 
system) and consumption (one-price system) imbalances. Production imbalance simply means the 
difference between the observed production and the latest submitted bidding production plan. The 
production plans are submitted to the TSOs in the afternoon the day before the delivery hour and 
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pricing and free bids are planned to be introduced in late 2019 (Koch & Hirth, 2018). Also, the imbalance settlement 
period in Germany is 15 minutes, whereas in the Nordics it is still one hour. 
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updates can be sent up to 45 minutes before the delivery after which they become binding. 
Consumption imbalance means the difference between the binding production plan and trades, 
which include purchases and sales from Elspot, Elbas and bilateral trades. Figure 2 summarizes 
the differences between one- and two-price systems. 
The two-price system, applied to production imbalances, penalises the market participants for 
exacerbating the system imbalance, if it is in the need for up- or down-regulating volumes. At the 
same time, market participants do not gain extra benefit, in comparison to trading the 
corresponding production imbalance volume in Elspot, if their production imbalances contributed 
to system imbalance mitigation. For instance, when the system is in the state of needing up-
regulation, and the participant has an excess production imbalance, the price received is equal to 
the Elspot price for the hour in question, instead of the higher up-regulation price (the positive 
imbalance in panel c, Figure 2). 
In contrast, under the one-price system applied to consumption imbalances market participants 
benefit from consumption imbalances, if they positively contributed to reducing the system 
imbalances. For instance, if a market participant had a deficit in the consumption imbalance and 
the system was in the down-regulation state, he or she would have to pay the lower down-
regulation price for the imbalance, instead of the higher (or equal) Elspot price for that hour (the 
negative imbalance in panel b, Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Imbalance pricing under one- and two-price systems 
The main difference between the production and consumption imbalances is that the production 
imbalance considers only the physical difference between the observed production and binding 
production plan during the delivery hour. However, because most of the market players trade 
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electricity on Elspot’s day-ahead market, unless they balance out their position on Elbas, or the 
regulating power market, their imbalances get settled according to the consumption imbalance 
pricing. It must be noted that a great uncertainty exists in predicting the balancing direction and 
prices, which reduces the incentive to strategically carrying out imbalances. Also as mentioned 
above, market players receive information about balancing prices with one hour delay, which 
makes the market less informed and transparent.  Additionally, when BRPs sign agreements with 
TSOs, they agree not to use open deliveries for systematic power purchases or deliveries (Fingrid, 
2018). 
Both the proactive balancing philosophy and the difference in pricing imbalances affect market 
participants’ willingness to participate in the intraday versus regulating market or to settle their 
imbalances in the phase of imbalance settlement. Price spread between the day-ahead and intraday 
prices can be explained by updates in production plans and demand from forecasted values after 
the closure of the day-ahead market. Thus, wind and demand forecast errors, among other things, 
are expected to be important factors explaining the spread. 
The links between intraday and regulating power market prices are more complex. First, the price 
spread between these two prices indicates the short-term balancing needs and, thus, costs of 
balancing. Second, there is also a link through trading strategies. Consider, for instance, a power 
producer that can ramp up its production flexibly. If there exist an ask in intraday market with a 
price higher than the day-ahead price, the flexible producer could sell extra production in intraday 
markets. Alternatively, the flexible producer can offer its extra production in the regulating power 
market for balancing purposes even closer to delivery. The revenue and need for production is 
however uncertain at the time bidding in the regulating power market auction. Hence, flexible 
producers get either a certain price during continuous intraday auction, conditional there is a 
counterpart in the intraday market, or uncertain price if waiting to the regulating power market. 
Wind producers, for instance, face similar kind of uncertainty. They can settle their imbalances 
caused by forecast errors by trading in intraday markets or wait until imbalance settlement.  
C. Electricity mix in the Nordics 
The Nordic electricity production has traditionally been dominated by hydro, nuclear, and thermal 
plants. The main market place for trading has been the day-ahead market, because it allows 
sufficient time for the dispatchable production units to ramp up and down (Norden, 2014). Trading 
patterns between bidding areas and other European electricity markets are often driven by 
differences in generation type and capacity, hydrological conditions, and the transmission network. 
Denmark and Finland in particular rely on electricity imports whereas Sweden and Norway are net 
exporters. Both Sweden and Finland have large baseload produced by nuclear and hydro power. 
Norway’s electricity production originates almost entirely from hydro power and Denmark’s 
electricity mix is dominated by wind and thermal plants.  
The Nordic countries also differ in the rate of vRES deployment and the type of support. Denmark 
was a forerunner in supporting wind power via feed-in premium tariffs, while Sweden has opted 
for the green certificate system since 2003, joined by Norway in 2012. Finland has since 2011 
supported wind power production via feed-in tariffs, but the support was capped by 2500 MVA 
capacity which was quickly reached. Finland has recently turned to an auction-based support 
mechanism and the speed of wind power deployment is slowly catching-up with the other Nordic 
states. The share of solar (photovoltaics) is still minor in the Nordic electricity supply. See Figure 
3 to observe the growth of wind power capacity and generation during 2000-2017. 
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Figure 3 Wind power capacity and generation in Sweden, Denmark and Finland 
Source: (VTT, 2019; Swedish Energy Authority, 2019; Danish Energy Authority, 2019) 
 In this paper we particularly focus on three Nordic countries, namely Finland, Denmark, and 
Sweden, for the following reasons. Denmark is a pioneer and well researched country which was 
able to integrate a large share of wind power into a system traditionally dominated by thermal 
plants. Sweden has rapidly increased its installed wind power capacity and despite its slower start 
overtook Denmark in installed capacity. Sweden is also in the process of decommissioning older 
nuclear plants and is planning to renounce nuclear power (Swedish Ministry of Energy, 2016), 
which has implications for generation adequacy. Finally, Finland has had a more moderate 
approach towards wind power deployment and relies on a diversified production mix. In contrast 
to Sweden, Finland is increasing nuclear power capacity with the nearly completed Olkiluoto-3 
and a new investment into Hanhikivi-1, adding a total new capacity of 2800 MW.  All three 
countries follow different approaches towards energy system decarbonisation and we expect these 
differences to play a role in explaining the usage and relevance of different electricity market 
places. 
In addition, the shares of wind power differ between Nord Pool bidding areas. This is described in 
Table 1 for years 2015-2017. The spatial variation in wind power shares provides us with an 
interesting comparison between Nord Pool bidding areas. The share of wind power is the highest 
in western part of Denmark (DK1): almost 57 percent of power generation was produced by wind 
power in 2017. In eastern part of Denmark (DK2) the share of wind power was 34 percent, 
respectively. In Sweden, the shares of wind power are the highest in southern part of the country 
(SE4), where 54 percent of power production was produced by wind in 2017. Even though the 
total electricity generation by wind is higher in the middle parts of Sweden (SE3 and SE2), the 
shares of total production are much lower than in south: 7 percent in SE3 and 12 percent in SE2 in 
2017. In northern Sweden (SE4) and Finland (FI), the shares of wind power are still modest. In 
both of these regions approximately 6 percent of electricity generation was produced by wind 
power in 2017. 
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Table 1 Wind power generation (TWh) and the shares of wind power in total electricity production (%) in 
Nord Pool bidding areas in Sweden (SE), Denmark (DK), and Finland (FI)  
    2015 2016 2017 
SE1 TWh 1.4 1.3 1.4 
  % 6.6 % 5.6 % 6.4 % 
SE2 TWh 4.7 4.9 5.4 
  % 10.4 % 12.9 % 12.4 % 
SE3 TWh 5.5 5.5 5.8 
  % 7.5 % 6.6 % 6.8 % 
SE4 TWh 3.8 3.8 4.3 
  % 51.6 % 50.2 % 54.1 % 
DK1 TWh 10.8 9.4 10.9 
  % 56.1 % 48.7 % 56.9 % 
DK2 TWh 2.9 2.4 3.0 
  % 36.7 % 29.6 % 34.0 % 
FI TWh 2.1 2.8 4.1 
  % 3.2 % 4.4 % 6.5 % 
SE-DK-FI TWh 31.1 30.1 34.9 
Total % 13.0 % 12.4 % 14.0 % 
Note: Data for Finnish wind power generation are from Fingrid database. All other data are from Nord Pool. Figures 
of wind power production in Sweden are missing for January 1 – January 23, 2015. Total production amounts are not 
considered for this period when calculating the shares of Swedish wind power in 2015. 
III. Relevant literature 
There is a vast academic literature that studies the effects of fundamentals, trading strategies, and 
market efficiency on individual electricity wholesale markets or their pairs. However, work that 
studies the trading behaviour and prices in all three electricity market places jointly is much 
scarcer. Literature that focuses on the day-ahead market typically observes the merit-order effect 
of vRES (Cludius, Hermann, Matthes, & Graichen, 2014), the associated decline in average 
(Gil;Gomez-Quiles;& Riquelme, 2012) or peak (Winkler, Gaio, Pfluger, & Ragwitz, 2016) 
electricity prices, increase in electricity price volatility (Ketterer, 2014) and the effects of CO2  
price (Hirth, 2018). 
Intraday markets are studied by Scharff and Amelin (2016) (Nordic region), Gianfreda et al. 
(2016) (Italy), Frade et al. (2018) (the Iberian Peninsula), and Märkle-Huß et al. (2018) and Kiesel 
and Praschiv (2017) (Germany). Most of the intraday studies assess the impacts of various 
fundamental variables, such as vRES and forecast errors, others focus on market design and 
liquidity (Furió & Lucia, 2009; Weber, 2010) or trading strategies for balancing wind power 
forecast errors (Henriot, 2012). Balancing market studies often focus on bidding strategies and the 
effects of imbalance settlement rules on profits (Holttinen & Koreneff, 2012; Ravnaas, Farahmand, 
& Doorman, 2010). Another research strand is a direct simulation of real-time balancing prices 
which are then used in bidding strategies in balancing markets (Olsson & Söder, 2008; Olsson, 
2005). 
There are few studies that focus on price differences between different electricity market places. 
For instance, Karanfil and Li (2017) study the functionality of the Nordic intraday market by 
investigating the main drivers of the price difference between the Nordic day-ahead and intraday 
markets. The authors study the causality between market fundamentals (wind forecast errors, 
conventional generation forecast errors, demand forecast errors and intraday cross-border 
electricity flow) and the price differential, finding among others that wind forecast errors Granger 
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cause the price difference in Denmark. Using VAR and impulse response functions, they claim 
intraday market to be effective because causality between the intraday price signals and market 
fundamentals was found. Pape et al. (2016) develop a fundamental model for German day-ahead 
and intraday markets and study the explanatory power of fundamentals on price variations, such 
as must-run operations of CHP and shortened intraday supply stack, on their price variations.  
Hagemann (2015) uses multiple linear regression to model the price difference between the 
German intraday and day-ahead prices by market fundamentals, such as load, wind and solar 
forecast errors, power plant outages, and cross border flows. He finds that intraday supply side 
shocks may have different price effects. Furió and Lucia (2009) study the price convergence 
between the Spanish day-ahead and intraday markets and find significant price differences 
between the two.  
Studied from another methodological angle (mixed integer program) and not directly working with 
price differences, Faria and Fleten (2011) find that for a price-taker medium-sized producer, 
considering Elbas when bidding on the day-ahead market does not impact significantly its profit. 
Knaut and Obermueller (2016) consider trading of renewable and conventional power generators 
in the German day-ahead and intraday markets and find that it is optimal for renewable producers 
to sell less than the expected production in the day-ahead market.  
Table 2 Literature on the impacts of vRES and other fundamentals on single and multiple electricity 
wholesale markets 
 Day-ahead Intraday Balancing 
Day-
ahead 
(Cludius, Hermann, Matthes, 
& Graichen, 2014; Gil, 
Gomez-Quiles, & Riquelme, 
2012; Ketterer, 2014; Hirth, 
2018; Winkler, Gaio, Pfluger, 
& Ragwitz, 2016) 
x x 
Intraday (Karanfil & Li, 2017) 
(Pape;Hagemann;& Weber, 
2016); (Faria & Fleten, 2011); 
(Knaut & Obermueller, 2016); 
(Hagemann, 2015); (Furió & 
Lucia, 2009) (Ito & Reguant, 
2016) 
(Scharff & Amelin, 2016); 
(Gianfreda, Parisio, & Pelagatti, 
2016); (Frade, Vieira-Costa, 
Osório, Santana, & Catalão, 
2018); (Märkle-Huß, 
Feuerriegel, & Neumann, 
2018); (Mauritzen, 2015); 
(Chavez-Ávila & Fernandes, 
2015) (Weber, 2010); (Kiesel & 
Paraschiv, 2017); (Henriot, 
2012) 
x 
Balancing (Boomsma, Juul, & Fleten, 
2014); (Vilim & Botterud, 
2014) (Holmberg & Lazarcyk, 
2015); (Hesamzadeh, 
Holmberg, & Sarfati, 2018) 
(Koch & Hirth, 2018); (Batalla-
Bejerano & Baute-Trojillo, 
2016) 
(Brouwer, van den Broek, 
Seebregts, & Faaij, 2014); 
(Holttinen, et al., 2011) (De 
Vos, Morbee, Driesen, & 
Belmans, 2013); (Hirth & 
Ziegenhagen, 2015); (Holttinen 
& Koreneff, 2012); (Ravnaas, 
Farahmand, & Doorman, 2010); 
(Olsson & Söder, 2008); 
(Olsson, 2005) 
Note: A study that refers to two same market places indicates that the study focused only on the one market place in 
question.  
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Koch and Hirth (2018) study the German intraday and balancing markets in the context of vRES. 
Among others, the authors study ex-post the difference between imbalance and intraday prices, 
which they dub the “imbalance price spread”. They interpret the spread as the opportunity 
cost/economic incentive for balance responsible parties (BRPs) to reduce imbalances. Their 
definition of imbalance price spread is the difference between imbalance price and the so-called 
ID3 price, which is volume-weighted average intraday price of trades between three hours and 30 
minutes before the real time. The authors, however, mainly focus on the institutional effects of 
improved short-term wholesale electricity trading (quarter-hourly contracts, 24/7 trading) which 
led to what (Hirth & Ziegenhagen, Balancing power and variable renewables: Three links, 2015) 
call “German balancing paradox”, i.e. the growth of vRES reduces the need for balancing services. 
Demonstrated on the German market, the authors call it a paradox because other studies typically 
found a positive effect of vRES on balancing reserves (Batalla-Bejerano & Baute-Trojillo, 2016; 
Brouwer, van den Broek, Seebregts, & Faaij, 2014; Holttinen, et al., 2011; De Vos, Morbee, 
Driesen, & Belmans, 2013). In another study (Batalla-Bejerano & Baute-Trojillo, 2016), the 
authors investigate the impacts of vRES on the balancing market requirements and costs measured 
by adjustment service cost (ASC). They calculate the ASC a price spread between what they called 
electricity final price, day-ahead price, intraday price, and capacity payments, which they attempt 
to econometrically model by different attributes of intermittent generation. 
Literature that jointly studies the day-ahead and balancing markets mostly focuses on coordinated 
bidding strategies of power generators in sequential electricity markets. For instance, Boomsma et 
al. (2014) quantify the gain from coordinated bidding in day-ahead and balancing markets, finding 
that there is no gain under a one-price balancing mechanism, but a significant gain under a two-
price balancing mechanism. Similarly, Vilim and Botterud (2014) optimal day-ahead bidding 
strategies under the two balancing mechanisms showing that wind power has a substantial 
influence on the day-ahead prices, imbalance pricing, and regulation volume. Another research 
strand argues that the reduced price difference between day-ahead and balancing (real time) 
markets reduces the arbitrage opportunity to oversell in export constrained nodes and buy-back 
cheap in real time markets  which mitigates the so-called increase-decrease game (Holmberg & 
Lazarcyk, 2015; Hesamzadeh, Holmberg, & Sarfati, 2018). 
IV. Data 
Our analysis focuses on three countries of the Nordic region that have experienced a rapid growth 
in wind power generation, but which differ in their market fundamentals. These differences bring 
interesting insights into the analysis and allow comparison of the same effects in different setting. 
The countries we study are Finland (FI), Sweden (SE1-SE4) and Denmark (DK1-DK2), totalling 
7 separate bidding areas. Time resolution of the data is one hour, and the time period studied are 
the years 2013-2017. Some of the summary statistics may include older data, which is clearly 
marked. The main sources of price and market fundamentals data are ENTSO-E’s Transparency 
Platform and Nord Pool’s FTP server, to which we were granted access. In subsection A we present 
information about prices from the three market places as well as their pairwise differences, which 
will represent the first endogenous variable in our three-variable VAR model, defined is section 
V. Additional two endogenous variables are specified in subsection B with further exogenous 
variables underlying the power market fundamentals. 
A. Market prices and spreads 
Our dataset comprises of hourly prices from three Nordic wholesale electricity markets, namely 
day-ahead (DA), intraday and (ID), and regulating power (RP) as well as their pairwise differences, 
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here called spreads, all measured in EUR/MWh. In section II we have specified each market price 
and its formation in detail, but their spreads require further interpretation. The spread between day-
ahead and intraday (DA-ID) markets measures the adjustment need due to supply and demand 
forecasting errors. This is because most of the trades are made 24 hours before the actual delivery 
or consumption, which are then updated by trades in the intraday market in order to balance out 
the errors. The price spread between day-ahead and regulating power (DA-RP) markets measures 
the scarcity of balancing resources which we interpret as an additional cost for delivering one 
MWh of electricity on top of the day-ahead and intraday price. The interpretation of the additional 
cost may be turned into a hypothetical benefit under the one-price system of the imbalance 
settlement, where strategic imbalances that aid the power system are rewarded on top of the day-
ahead price. However, at the gate closure of the regulating power market most of the participants 
(who do not/cannot participate) do not know precisely the imbalance settlement price, which is 
disclosed only with one hour delay. This spread is therefore calculated ex-post and the delayed 
price disclosure, and the underlying uncertainty should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
hypothetical gains from gaming the one-price system of the imbalance settlement.  
Finally, the spread between regulating power and intraday (ID-RP) markets reflects the economic 
incentive (opportunity cost) to reduce imbalances. This is because the intraday market is the last 
opportunity to reduce trade imbalances before facing the imbalance settlement based on the 
regulating power prices. Alternatively, ID-RP spread can be interpreted as an opportunity for 
additional revenues for qualified8 market participants offering flexibility to the TSOs. It must be 
remembered that trading in the regulating power market carries additional risks  of not being 
dispatched because the need for regulating power does not arise or the offered flexibility is in the 
opposite direction (up in down-regulation state, or down in up-regulation state). The interpretation 
of the price spreads is summarized in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Summary of price spreads 
As described in section II, the intraday market is a continuous market following a pay-as-bid 
double auction, which means there can be dozens of different prices for the same hour in the same 
area. To calculate a representative intraday price, we calculate a volume-weighted average price9 
for each hour and area. This approach places a greater emphasis on trades carried out closer to 
                                                 
8 Resources that can carry out a 10 MW change of power in 15 minutes (5 MW if using electronic activation), see section  II. 
9 For a comparison we have also calculated the so-called ID3 price as in the German Epex intraday market. However, this lead to 
a loss of large number of observations due to no trade activity three hours before delivery. For this reason we preferred the weighted 
average to derive a representative intraday price.   
DA-ID 
ID-RP 
DA-RP 
Day-ahead – intraday: 
Adjustment need due to supply 
and demand forecasting errors. 
Intraday – regulating power: 
Economic incentive (opportunity 
cost) to reduce imbalances and 
benefit from additional flexibility.  
Day-ahead – regulating power: 
Scarcity of balancing resources; 
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delivery, when most of the intraday volume is traded. Detailed summary statistics of the intraday 
market based on over 1.8 million trades among 22 bidding zones between 2012-2017 are presented 
in the Appendix, Table 7. Note that occasionally no Elbas trades occur for a given hour which 
implies no need for trade adjustment. In our price spreads’ calculations, we replace these missing 
points with the day-ahead price, which best reflects the market’s need in a given hour. The 
regulating power price is simply based on the direction of the regulation market (up, down, none) 
with their respective prices, see section II for details.  
The summary of price levels and spreads is presented in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. From 
Table 3 it can be seen that the mean and median prices in all three market places are the highest in 
Finland and lowest in DK1. The high skewness and kurtosis in DK1 in panel (a) is due to price 
spike on June 7, 2013 when the price cap of 2000 EUR/MWh was approached between hours 7-
11. Price caps and floors were also hit in the regulating power market, panel (c), in Finland and 
Sweden, and overall, the regulating market is the most volatile among the three. The intraday 
market, panel (c), has much fewer price spikes and is less volatile compared to the other two. 
Table 3 Summary of price levels, 2013-2017 
 (a) Day-ahead price   
Area Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt 
FI 43824 34.494 32.98 12.78958 0.32 214.25 2.285 22.038 
SE1 43824 30.313 29.98 10.30147 0.32 214.25 1.667 21.748 
SE2 43824 30.315 29.98 10.30255 0.32 214.25 1.666 21.738 
SE3 43824 30.708 30.11 10.86307 0.32 214.25 1.874 21.206 
SE4 43824 31.290 30.39 11.31979 0.32 214.25 1.752 18.409 
DK1 43824 29.859 29.67 23.62825 -62.03 2000 60.506 4900.812 
DK2 43824 31.522 30.7 12.50806 -62.03 214.25 1.168 14.362 
 (b) Intraday price   
Area Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt 
FI 42853 33.688 32.243 12.779 -8.798 194.683 1.699 13.444 
SE1 26028 29.569 29.054 10.011 -12.000 213.890 1.816 24.666 
SE2 38326 29.454 29.000 10.272 -5.817 188.000 1.198 13.455 
SE3 40332 29.934 29.258 11.037 -7.769 209.432 1.639 16.816 
SE4 19676 32.117 31.000 11.739 -10.000 275.000 2.485 31.738 
DK1 27165 30.506 30.000 11.963 -36.000 124.892 0.570 5.575 
DK2 28538 31.526 30.409 13.129 -54.001 197.000 1.153 11.032 
 (c) Regulating power price   
Area Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt 
FI 43824 34.747 30.82 35.4273 -1000 3000 26.512 1895.125 
SE1 43824 29.251 28.455 17.21342 -66.89 1999 38.228 3984.663 
SE2 43824 29.264 28.47 17.23127 -66.89 1999 38.120 3968.152 
SE3 43824 30.068 28.73 19.45091 -66.89 1999 29.486 2511.380 
SE4 43824 30.908 28.93 21.32594 -66.89 1999 23.537 1746.313 
DK1 43824 29.352 28.23 17.36887 -159.8 335.01 3.408 38.663 
DK2 43824 31.694 29.2 23.25354 -112.5 1999 18.773 1239.024 
Note: The intraday Elbas market does not always provide a price for each hour due to the lack of trade, therefore the 
original sample size of this market is smaller than that of the day-ahead and regulating markets. 
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From Table 4 it can be seen that in DK1 and DK2, the median spreads are zero across the three 
market places, implying the highest integration among the market places. This is interesting given 
the dominance of variable wind power generation in Denmark’s generation mix, see section B 
below. The mean spreads between day-ahead and intraday (DA-ID) markets are mostly positive 
(highest in FI, and SE1-SE3), suggesting there is sufficient capacity in the intraday market which 
is discounted in comparison to the day-ahead market. The median spreads between day-ahead and 
regulating power (DA-RP) are zero in all bidding areas which points to non-systematic scarcity 
for up- or down-regulation and that strategic imbalances are not riskless. Up- and down-regulation 
events happen with approximately the same frequency - in reality this is roughly 40% up-
regulation, 30% down-regulation, 30% no regulation. The median spreads between the regulating 
power and intraday price (ID-RP) are non-zero and even more negatively skewed than the DA-RP 
spread. The negative skewness points out to infrequent but high up-regulation prices that drive the  
mean ID-RP spread to the negative territory and increasing the motivation for a balanced portfolio 
to avoid high imbalance costs. From the perspective that ID-RP spread indicates the opportunity 
for additional revenues, FI and SE4 are bidding areas where this spread/opportunity is the highest. 
In the Appendix, Figure 13 and Figure 14 explores the mean market price levels and spreads by 
hour of the day, respectively.  
To get a better understanding of the actual costs and benefits associated with price spreads, we 
consider the absolute price spreads which take into account the both-sidedness of the underlying 
price risk. The absolute mean price spreads are displayed in Figure 5 - Figure 7. 
Table 4 Summary of price spreads, 2013-2017 
 (a) Day-ahead  — intraday price (DA-ID)   
Area Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt 
FI 43824 0.858 0.576 6.256 -112.462 131.622 0.099 58.020 
SE1 43824 0.533 0.000 3.482 -134.580 105.080 -7.010 372.034 
SE2 43824 0.933 0.586 3.474 -62.640 79.818 0.780 52.608 
SE3 43824 0.860 0.543 3.873 -109.502 83.382 -1.511 80.489 
SE4 43824 0.029 0.000 3.711 -177.410 133.520 -5.676 423.914 
DK1 43824 0.446 0.000 20.440 -78.710 1930.832 87.732 8048.318 
DK2 43824 0.468 0.000 4.577 -87.252 92.558 0.265 45.204 
 (b) Day-ahead  — regulating power price (DA-RP)   
Area Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt 
FI 43824 -0.253 0.000 33.072 -2957.250 1026.480 -31.037 2416.097 
SE1 43824 1.061 0.000 14.323 -1972.580 185.250 -64.923 8360.224 
SE2 43824 1.052 0.000 14.342 -1972.580 185.250 -64.684 8316.274 
SE3 43824 0.641 0.000 16.060 -1909.240 185.250 -45.480 4734.638 
SE4 43824 0.381 0.000 17.856 -1909.240 185.250 -34.642 3114.149 
DK1 43824 0.507 0.000 24.104 -284.190 1965.840 55.603 4474.728 
DK2 43824 -0.173 0.000 19.559 -1909.240 185.250 -27.165 2168.287 
 (c) Intraday — regulating power price (ID-RP)   
Area Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt 
FI 43824 -1.111 0.299 32.146 -2941.424 1024.804 -33.318 2669.203 
SE1 43824 0.529 0.040 14.235 -1972.580 185.250 -65.868 8555.293 
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SE2 43824 0.119 0.073 13.976 -1972.484 159.125 -69.504 9190.135 
SE3 43824 -0.219 0.063 15.587 -1921.632 169.333 -50.452 5469.146 
SE4 43824 0.353 0.200 17.607 -1909.240 185.250 -36.030 3293.848 
DK1 43824 0.062 0.000 12.492 -284.190 187.680 -5.054 73.017 
DK2 43824 -0.641 0.000 19.140 -1927.294 156.846 -29.286 2442.005 
Note: When the intraday Elbas price was missing, this was substituted by the day-ahead price for the respective hour 
and bidding area. 
 
Figure 5 - Figure 7 display the average absolute price spreads per year between the pairs of market 
places, assuming 1MWh trades per hour in each market. In addition to magnitudes we were 
interested in whether any trend across years exists. The figures reveal a contrast between mostly 
increasing spread in the day-ahead and intraday markets, and mostly declining spread in the other 
two markets. This finding implies that the market’s need for adjusting positions in the intraday 
market is growing, but the scarcity of the balancing resources is not worsening. Nonetheless, taking 
into account the absolute spreads’ magnitudes of around 2-4 EUR/MWh in relation to the day-
ahead price of around 30EUR.MWh, this is a very sizable risk to the market participants. In 
contrast, we could look at the absolute DA-RP spread as a hypothetical benefit to be gained from 
strategic imbalances using the one-price system, i.e. having imbalances that helped to limit power 
shortage (having excess) or oversupply (having deficit). By the same token, the RP-ID absolute 
spread represents a sizable risk from keeping imbalances or the opportunity for additional revenues 
from offering flexibility in the regulating power market. 
 
Figure 5 Average absolute price spreads between day-ahead and intraday prices for 1MWh 
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Figure 6 Average absolute price spreads between day-ahead and regulating power prices for 1MWh 
 
Figure 7 Average absolute price spreads between regulating power and intraday prices for 1MWh 
B. Power market fundamentals 
This work is primarily interested in the impacts of intermittent wind power production on the 
relevance of different electricity wholesale markets, we therefore focus on the uncertainty around 
wind power production. This uncertainty is often measured by wind forecast errors (MWh) which 
we calculate as the difference between wind power production forecast 1 day before delivery minus 
the realized wind power production. Positive values indicate over-forecasted production whereas 
negative values represent under-forecast. 
We possess wind power production data for the entire studied horizon, but we were unable to 
obtain reliable wind power forecasts data from Sweden and Finland from earlier than 
approximately the second half of 2014. For this reason, a shorter time horizon is used in 
distribution summary of forecast wind errors in Figure 8, as well as in the final VAR models of 
the Swedish and Finnish markets. Nevertheless, over three years of hourly data is a sufficient 
sample size for a reliable time series analysis. In Figure 8 the red vertical line shows the mean 
wind forecast errors, the teal line represents standard normal distribution function and the black 
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line stands for the kernel density estimation based on the actual observations. The mean of the 
forecast errors is close to zero in DK2 and SWE, slightly positive (overforecast) in DK1 and quite 
negative (underforecast) in FI where a left tail is also apparent.  
 
Figure 8 Distribution of wind forecast errors for Denmark (DK1-DK2), Finland (FI), and Sweden (SWE) 
In addition to the supply risk, we model the uncertainty about the demand-side, namely demand 
forecast error, defined as the difference between hourly electricity demand forecasted 1 day before 
and the realized demand. The mean demand in DK1 and DK2 has been around 2.3 GWh/h and 1.5 
GWh/h, respectively, with a standard deviation of approximately 400 MWh/h. The very high 
kurtosis (peakedness) of the Danish demand forecast errors in Figure 9 is due to a couple of rare 
events, such as under-forecast of almost 2 GWh/h in DK1 on October 23, 2013 or overforecast of 
1.5 GWh/h in DK2 on December 15, 2016. The demand forecast errors are mostly normally 
distributed in Finland and Sweden, where the mean demand over 2013-2017 has 9.4 GWh/h and 
15.6 GWh/h, respectively. 
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Figure 9 Demand forecast errors for Finland (FI), Sweden (SWE) and Denmark (DK1-DK2), 2013-2017 
Next, we define several exogenous fundamental variables and controls. Power system can be 
impacted not only by the error about wind power production, but also by the sudden change in the 
output of intermittent power generation. This is because sudden hourly variations in wind 
productions need to be accommodated by sufficient flexible resources, see for instance (Batalla-
Bejerano & Baute-Trojillo, 2016). We therefore control for the wind power ramping (MWh/h), 
defined as hourly change in realized wind power production. Positive values imply ramping-up 
wind generation and negative ramping-down.  
The role of cross-border transmission network and the impact of congestion on prices has been 
discussed in section II. We include a variable that controls for transmission bottlenecks by 
indicating whether a bidding area’s day-ahead hourly price differed from the reference system 
price. The transmission bottlenecks and flows are especially relevant for the day-ahead price 
formation, whereas the intraday cross-border flows follow physical limitations instead of 
commercial activity (Pape, Hagemann, & Weber, 2016). Hydro power is a dominant source of 
power generation in the Nordic region, where price levels and their dynamics are impacted by 
seasonal hydrological conditions. We control for hydrological conditions in Norway, Sweden and 
Finland by calculating a difference between the running historical median of hydro reservoir 
fillings since 1995 and the current hydro reservoir filling, both measured in percentages. Figure 10 
presents weekly deviations of hydro reservoir fillings showing, for example, that Norway 
experienced a drier period in July 2015 or that Finland had better than usual hydro conditions in 
May 2016.  Finally, we control the diurnal and seasonal patterns by including week of sample 
fixed effects and hour fixed effects.   
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Figure 10 Deviations of weekly hydro reservoir fillings (%), 2013-2017 
Note: Deviations are measured as the difference between the current percentage level of hydro-reservoir filling and 
the respective historical median measured since 1995. Negative values represent drier than usual week and positive 
values represent higher reservoir values than in a typical week, measured in percentages. 
V. Methods 
We study the dynamics of three electricity market prices in a vector autoregression (VAR) setup, 
specified as linear functions of their own lags, the lags of every other variable in the vector, and 
exogenous variables. By this dynamic modelling approach, we are able to perform causal inference 
and provide policy advice (Luetkepohl, 2011). This is because compared to, for instance, OLS 
which provides a static picture of temporally interrelated variables, VAR model can capture this 
temporality and follow the trajectories of price signals and their responses to imbalances. 
We focus on three endogenous(response) variables, namely price spreads (DA-ID, DA-RP, ID-
RP), wind forecast errors, and load forecast errors in 7 bidding areas (3 countries), which gives us 
63 response variables studied over the years 2013-2017. The VAR model is specified in equation 
[1]:   𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝐴𝐴1𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 + 𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 (1) 
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is a 3x1 vector of endogenous variables (PriceSpread𝑡𝑡, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊t)’, 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = (𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡, … 𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)′ is a dx1 vector of exogenous variables, A𝑖𝑖 are 3x3 matrices of lag 
coefficients to be estimated, B is a 3x1 matrix  of exogenous variable coefficients to be estimated, a0 is a 3x1 vector of constant terms; and ϵt is a 3x1 vector of white noise innovation process, with 
E(ϵt) = 0, E(ϵt, ϵt′) = Σϵ, and E(ϵt, ϵs′) = 0 for 𝑡𝑡 ≠ 𝑠𝑠.  
In VAR model it is assumed that all of the endogenous variables are stationary. We test this 
assumption by Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test as well as alternative unit-root tests, all 
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confirming the stationarity of our time series variables. For the sake of brevity, the tests statistics 
are not reported here but are available upon request from the corresponding author.  
Another important step in VAR modelling is the selection of appropriate lag-order structure of the 
endogenous variables, which we base on theory (minimizing Akaike and Bayesian information 
criteria, AIC and BIC respectively) and practice (capturing the diurnal pattern). Our lag structure 
includes each hour of the previous day (1-24) and the same hour two days before (48). To capture 
the seasonal structure, we additionally include week and hour fixed effects in the form of dummy 
variables. 
Because correlation does not necessarily imply causation and because we are primarily interested 
in the latter, we focus on testing the causality among our endogenous variables. Granger (1969) 
defined a testable definition of causality which tests whether x causes y by testing whether the 
lagged values of x improve the explanation of y, in comparison to using the lags of y process alone. 
This causality in the Granger-sense tests the significance of the information content of x for 
explaining y. We test a bidirectional Granger causality between each pair of the endogenous 
variables and report the 𝜒𝜒2 statistics of the Wald test for the joint hypothesis of  𝛽𝛽1=𝛽𝛽2=...=𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙=0, 
for each equation in [2]. The null hypothesis is that x in the first regression and y in the second 
regression does not Granger-cause y and x, respectively.   𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 (2)  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
Finally, after specifying a stable VAR model (all eigenvalues of the dynamic matrix lie within the 
unit circle) and exploring the pairwise causality, we trace the marginal effects of a shock (impulse) 
to one endogenous variable on another endogenous variable (response). The magnitude, duration, 
and direction of the responses can be studied by orthogonized impulse response functions (IRF), which use 
the estimated results from [2] to quantify the impact of one standard deviation shock at time t on 
the expected values of y at time t+n. To further gain insight into how important each shock is to 
the expected y, we measure the fraction of the forecast error variance of an endogenous variable 
that can be contributed to orthogonalized shocks to another endogenous variable. The next section 
provides the results and discusses the main findings.  
VI. Results and discussion 
In this section we present the main results and discuss the causal links (subsection A) and dynamic 
relationships (subsection B) between spreads and forecasting errors. These results are based on the 
postestimation statistics (Granger causality and impulse response functions, respectively) of the 
VAR system. In subsection C we explore the effects of exogenous variables on spreads. We report 
only the coefficients of exogenous variables and model fit statistics of the estimated VAR models 
in Appendix, Table 8. 
A. Granger-causality tests 
In this subsection we present the supply and demand factors causing the spreads in the Granger-
sense. As a reminder, the Granger-causality is a probabilistic account of causality where we are 
observing whether past values of other endogenous variables, in our case wind and consumption 
forecast errors, help to forecast the future spreads. Hence, Granger-causality is rather an 
anticipatory effect than the cause-and-effect relationship as understood by microeconomics.  
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Table 5 shows the chi-square test statistics testing the null hypothesis that wind or consumption 
forecasting errors do not Granger-cause the spreads. The main finding from the table is that wind 
forecast errors do not cause the spreads in bidding areas with lower shares of wind power 
generation (FI, SE1, SE2). Vice versa, spreads in areas with large shares of wind power are 
significantly driven by wind forecast errors, especially in DK2 and SE4, but also in SE3 and DK1 
(except DA-ID). This implies that there may be a threshold effect when spreads start to be driven 
by wind power forecast when the share of wind power reaches a certain threshold.  
The spreads are the most clearly demand-driven in Finland, as indicated by the significance of 
consumption forecast errors across all market places. In fact, consumption forecast errors Granger 
cause most of the spreads except in  DK2 and SE1, which was also the finding of (Karanfil & Li, 
2017) with respect to DK2. The threshold or size effect may be in play here again where the 
consumption error is not significant in areas with relatively low consumption.  
Our findings underline the utmost relevance of the demand-side measures for spreads. It is evident 
that through adequate demand-side measures balancing risks and costs can be controlled and 
lowered by bringing the market prices closer to each other. Demand-side management has the 
possibility to counterbalance the negative effects of wind power forecasts in DK1, SE3 and SE4 
where they both exert influence on the spreads. 
Table 5 Granger causality between wind and demand forecast errors and spreads 
Area Market Wind forecast error Consumption forecast error 
FI 
DA-ID 24.09 79.22*** 
DA-RP 30.31 115.05*** 
ID-RP 28.37 104.38*** 
DK1 
DA-ID 11.44 69.51*** 
DA-RP 123.92*** 78.18*** 
ID-RP 334.73*** 97.18*** 
DK2 
DA-ID 75.83*** 32.3 
DA-RP 181.61*** 32.58 
ID-RP 158.93*** 25.74 
SE1 
DA-ID 25.16 25.81 
DA-RP 25.74 25.3 
ID-RP 21.28 27.94 
SE2 
DA-ID 19.92 32.61 
DA-RP 20.03 94.91*** 
ID-RP 21 94.72*** 
SE3 
DA-ID 24.46 95.27*** 
DA-RP 39.26** 121.93*** 
ID-RP 35.58* 111.19*** 
SE4 
DA-ID 48.02*** 36.09* 
DA-RP 65.03*** 42.32** 
ID-RP 57.48*** 47.29*** 
Note: The table shows the results of Granger causality which tests whether wind or consumption forecast errors 
Granger cause the spreads, i.e. divergence between wholesale electricity market places. The table shows 𝜒𝜒2 statistic 
with significance levels, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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B. Impulse response functions 
The results from the Granger-causality tests provided useful information about the relevance and 
significance of supply and demand factors for price spreads. However, we do not know much about 
the magnitudes and direction of these effects. In this part we focus on the trajectories of price 
spreads and their responses to supply and demand shocks. Figure 11 presents the impulse response 
functions (IRFs) which show a one standard deviation shock to either wind forecast error or 
demand forecast error and the response of a price spread during the following 24 hour period. For 
the sake of brevity, we show IRFs only for four selected bidding areas (DK1, DK2, FI and SE3) 
and two spreads (DA-ID and ID-RP). In fact, the IRFs for DA-RP spread not shown here are very 
similar to the ID-RP so responses can be quickly deduced from these.  
We first focus on the effects of wind forecast errors on the price spreads, shown in the left column 
of Figure 11. It is perhaps the most surprising finding that wind forecast errors do not significantly 
affect the DA-ID spread in DK1, where the highest absolute and relative wind power generation 
is located. There are several possible reasons for this finding which is in contrast to previous work 
conducted on much shorter and older sample (Karanfil & Li, 2017). First, bidding area DK1 
belongs to the synchronous zone of Continental Europe, whereas DK2 is part of the Nordic 
synchronous zone to which the rest of our sample belongs. In conditions with sufficient available 
transmission capacities asynchronous areas can pool generation and consumption resources as well 
as share balancing reserves.  
However, DK1 experiences an overflow of wind power that is not always possible to internally 
utilize or export due to the limited cross-border capacity. Konti-Skan interconnector from DK1 to 
SE3 has a capacity of approximately 700 MW but is often congested, as is the AC line between 
DK1 and Germany, which is often blocked for exports due to internal congestion in the German 
grid. There are grid investment plans to allow transporting the excess wind production to the 
Continental Europe, such as the new 700 MW interconnector COBRAcable between DK1 and the 
Netherlands, or reinforcement of the DK1-SE3 link. Nonetheless, excess wind power and limited 
export capacity seem to explain the finding that wind power forecast errors are not digested in the 
intraday market, as indicated by the insignificant effect on DA-ID. Instead, the correction is done 
via the shorter-term markets where a positive (overforecast) shock to wind forecast error leads to 
a drop of ID-RP spread by over 50 euro cents/MWh in the first two hours. This implies that the 
realized wind power generation is less than forecasted which, ceteris paribus, creates greater 
pressure on up-regulation price than on the intraday price, and thus increases the absolute value of 
the negative ID-RP spread. This effect holds true for ID-RP spreads in  DK2 (similar magnitude) 
and weakly in SE3 (drop of 20 cents/MWh after two hours). We do not find significant effects of 
wind forecast errors on spreads in Finland, in line with the Granger-causality results above.  
In contrast to DK1, wind forecast errors do significantly impact the DA-ID spread in DK2, 
underlying the difference between the Danish asynchronous bidding areas and the greater 
interconnection of DK2 to both the Nordic region and Continental Europe. The significant impact 
of a wind power forecast shock on DA-ID in DK2, SE3 and FI is between 5-10 euro cents/MWh 
within the first four hours after the shock. The interpretation is the same as above. 
 
   
Figure 11 Impulse response functions showing responses of price spreads to shocks in wind and demand 
forecast errors during the next 24 hours 
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Note: The figure shows responses of price spreads (DA-ID and ID-RP) to one standard deviation in wind or 
consumption forecast error during the following 24 hours. The grey area represents 95 percent confidence 
intervals. 
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Next, we turn to observe the responses of price spreads to the shocks in consumption forecast 
errors as shown in the right column of Figure 11. We can deepen the previous finding  that most 
of the price spreads are demand-driven, as shown by the Granger-causality results. The first and 
the most important finding is that the consumption forecast errors have a significantly positive 
impact on most of the price spreads. More explicitly, positive (overforecasted demand) shock shifts 
the demand curve to the left from the forecasted consumption in the day-ahead market. With lower 
than expected consumption in the real time markets the prices in the intraday and regulating power 
decline, which implies increased DA-ID and ID-RP spreads. We can interpret this as such, that the 
excess demand is sold back at discount in the intraday market (DA-ID) or that the non-realized 
consumption/excess supply leads to down-regulation (ID-RP). Similarly, negative consumption 
shock (underforecasted consumption) shifts the demand curve outwards to the right, increasing the 
prices in the intraday market (DA-ID) or regulating power market (ID-RP) markets and the price 
adjustment to the unexpected excess demand occurs in the real-time.   
The most pronounced effects of consumption forecast errors on price spreads are in FI and SE3, 
where a positive shock leads to an increase of 10-20 euro cents/MWh in DA-ID and 80 euro cents 
to 1.5 euro/MWh in ID-RP during the first four hours after the event. As previously argued, the 
insignificance of consumption forecast errors on the spreads in DK2 can be due to the relatively 
low consumption as compared to DK1, where a positive shock significantly increases especially 
the ID-RP spread by 40 euro cents/MWh within the first four hours.  
Two points can be raised from observing the IRFs. First, all significant supply and demand shocks 
dissipate within a half a day or shorter time period, which points out to active market participants 
efficiently adjusting to market conditions in the short-run. Second, the impacts of shocks are much 
greater in the short-term markets (ID-RP) which reflects the higher costs of balancing reserves as 
well as the uncertainty and thus risk premia in the regulating power prices.  
C. Impacts of exogenous variables 
Finally, we explore the effects of exogenous variables on the price spreads. Hydro deviations do 
significantly and negatively impact most of the spreads, especially the Swedish hydro in SE3 and 
the Swedish hydro in DK2. The effect is stronger in the DA-RP and ID-RP spreads than in the 
DA-ID spread. The negative sign can be interpreted as such that better (worse) than usual hydro-
conditions decrease (increase) the spreads, which implies a stronger effect directly on the levels of 
the day-ahead and intraday markets while the regulating power market remains less affected by 
the deviations. This is an interesting finding, implying that despite the changes in hydro reservoirs 
the cost of balancing remains stable relative to the day-ahead (in DA-RP spread) and intraday 
markets (in ID-RP spread). Exception is DK2, whose DA-ID and DA-RP spreads seem to be 
significantly and positively impacted by the deviations in the Finnish hydro implying an impact 
on the cost of balancing. Interestingly, the deviations in the Norwegian hydro do not seem to 
significantly affect spreads, except negatively the Finnish DA-ID spread.  
The ramping of wind power has a significantly positive impact on DA-RP and ID-RP spreads in 
DK1, DK2, and SE4, whereas negative impact on DA-ID spreads in Finland. This means that in 
areas with large share of wind power generation (DK1, DK2, and SE4), the wind power ramping 
is associated with direct impact on balancing costs. The sudden ramp-ups (ramp-downs) in wind 
power seem to reduce (increase) the regulating power price, leading to increasing (decreasing) 
spreads between DA-RP and ID-RP. In Finland, wind power ramping appears to exert a greater 
28 
 
pressure on the intraday market, in comparison to the day-ahead price, where ramp-ups (ramp-
downs) in wind power decrease (increase) the intraday price. 
Finally, the day-ahead congestion indicator appears to be mostly insignificant for the spreads, 
except having a significantly positive impact on DA-ID in SE4 and significantly negative impact 
on DA-RP and ID-RP in DK2, and on ID-RP in DK1. The negative impact on DK spreads means 
that during congestion, the cost of balancing increases by approximately 50 euro cents/MWh. The 
positive impact on the DA-ID spread in SE4 during congested hours can mean that the average 
day-ahead price is higher during these events due to limited import capacity, or that the intraday 
price is lower due to the higher local intraday supply. 
VII. Conclusions 
Increased shares of wind power are affecting wholesale electricity markets in many ways. First, 
overall price levels are decreasing, when production capacity with low marginal costs is entering 
into the markets. This affects, for instance, the profitability of conventional condensing power 
plants. Second, the increasing shares of stochastic wind generation bring along greater deviations 
between the real time power generation and the day-ahead forecasts of power supply. This is 
expected to increase the needs for balancing services, and thereby the costs of keeping the power 
system in balance. 
The growing share of renewable energy production also changes the relationship and importance 
of different marketplaces in the electricity market. The closer-to-delivery markets, e.g. intraday 
and regulating markets, are expected to become more important in terms of trading activity and 
price discovery. It is important to understand these dynamics because to date, the day-ahead market 
has been dominant and has served as a basis for new electricity generation investments, real-time 
pricing and hedging strategies, among other things. This work fills the gap in the current literature 
and studies all three main electricity wholesale market places in a single study. 
We have particularly studied the price spreads between the day-ahead, intraday and regulating 
power markets in Denmark, Sweden, and Finland in 2013 – 2017. We have exploited the variation 
in the share of wind power in different Nord Pool bidding areas in these three Nordic countries. 
We have used vector autoregression (VAR) models to explain the interrelationships between the 
price spreads and the effects of wind forecast and demand forecast errors, and other exogenous 
variables, such as transmission congestions and hydrological conditions, on price spreads in 
different bidding areas. The novelty of our study is that we are able to disentangle the effects on 
intraday and regulating power markets by analysing the price spreads between different market 
places (day-ahead, intraday and regulating power markets) jointly. 
We have found that wind forecast errors do affect the price spreads in areas with large shares of 
wind power generation, such as in Denmark and in southern Sweden. In southern Sweden (SE4) 
and in eastern part of Denmark (DK2), where the wind power is in a dominant position in the 
market, wind forecast errors affect (i.e. Granger-cause) all price spreads. Western Denmark (DK1), 
where the highest absolute and relative wind power generation is located, makes an exception. 
There wind forecast errors have no statistically significant impact on the spread between day-ahead 
and intraday prices. This can be explained, for instance, by excess wind power and limited export 
capacity, and by the fact that the bidding area DK1 belongs to the synchronous zone of Continental 
Europe, unlike other studied bidding areas. Positive forecast errors, i.e. forecasted wind power 
production is higher than the realized production, tend to decrease the price spreads. In DK1, and 
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also in the middle part of Sweden (SE3) where the shares of wind power are lower but still 
meaningful, wind forecast errors affect only the price spreads between intraday (or day-ahead) and 
regulating power markets. Finally, in those bidding areas where the shares of wind power are still 
modest, such as in northern Sweden (SE1) and Finland (FI), wind forecast errors have no 
statistically significant effect on the price spreads. Hence, we have found a threshold effect, 
meaning the causality in the Granger sense is relevant for spreads only after a certain threshold of 
the share of wind power in the electricity market. However, we did not explicitly search this 
threshold in this paper. 
Moreover, we have found that demand forecast errors do have an impact on almost all price 
spreads, except in areas with relatively low consumption. This may again be an indication of the 
threshold or size effect. We have also found that hydro deviations do significantly and negatively 
impact most of the spreads, having larger impact on the day-ahead and intraday price levels than 
on the regulating power market.  The ramping of wind power has a significantly positive impact 
on DA-RP and ID-RP spreads in areas with large share of wind power generation (DK1, DK2, and 
SE4), and is thus associated with a direct impact on balancing costs. Finally, the day-ahead 
congestion indicator appears to be mostly insignificant for the spreads, with some exceptions in 
areas with large share of wind power generation. 
In this paper, we have quantitatively shown that increasing shares of wind power are changing the 
relevance of different market places. This has implications for future market design, where markets 
closer to real time play more important role than in the past. For the next steps, it would be useful 
to expand our method and find the economic value of flexibility and demand response. Also, 
finding a quantitative threshold for the wind and consumption forecasts could be interesting, even 
though these will often be market/area specific. We were mainly interested in the effects of wind 
power on the relevance of market places, however, the effects of solar PV as another major source 
of vRES should be explored. Finally, exploring the Explore microstructure of the intraday market 
in more detail, such as liquidity and transactions costs, which could explain why, for instance, 
wind forecasts errors do not impact DA-ID spreads in DK1.  
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IX. Appendix 
Table 6 Mean price levels by year, 2013-2017  
(a) Day-ahead price 
 FI SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 DK1 DK2 
2013 41.156 39.190 39.190 39.448 39.929 38.981 39.608 
2014 36.023 31.422 31.422 31.621 31.915 30.671 32.153 
2015 29.658 21.164 21.176 22.004 22.901 22.894 24.486 
2016 32.445 28.951 28.951 29.234 29.529 26.668 29.396 
2017 33.192 30.842 30.842 31.239 32.181 30.090 31.971 
Total 34.494 30.313 30.315 30.708 31.290 29.859 31.522 
(b) Intraday price 
 FI SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 DK1 DK2 
2013 40.439 37.871 37.656 38.441 40.910 39.765 42.311 
2014 35.042 30.866 30.541 31.051 31.947 31.561 32.862 
2015 28.375 21.446 20.938 21.719 24.738 23.872 24.840 
2016 31.934 28.930 28.348 28.748 30.587 27.216 30.163 
2017 32.798 30.182 29.674 30.105 33.583 30.076 31.860 
Total 33.688 29.569 29.454 29.934 32.117 30.506 31.526 
(c) Imbalance consumption price 
 FI SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 DK1 DK2 
2013 41.294 37.935 37.935 38.643 39.310 37.570 39.359 
2014 35.995 30.850 30.850 31.316 31.882 31.096 32.911 
2015 30.496 20.381 20.442 21.819 22.883 22.972 25.204 
2016 32.691 27.695 27.695 28.445 29.049 25.667 29.061 
2017 33.262 29.400 29.400 30.121 31.423 29.465 31.944 
Total 34.747 29.251 29.264 30.068 30.908 29.352 31.694 
Note: The intraday Elbas market does not always provide a price for each hour due to the lack of trade, therefore the 
original sample size of this market is smaller than that of the day-ahead and regulating markets. 
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Figure 12 Total traded volumes on Elbas in GWh during 2012-2017 
Note: The bidding areas on the left edge with index _b indicate buying volumes, whereas the bidding areas on the 
right with index _s indicate selling volumes; Total of 32151.93 GWh traded. From 26 November 2014 in addition to 
the code KT used for trades in the German area 4 new German TSO areas (50HZ, TTG, AMP, TBW) have been added. 
 
   
Table 7 Intraday (Elbas) market summary by area over 2012-2017 
 
VWAP_b VWAP_s Tot Volume_b Tot Volume_s Net Volume Turnover_b Turnover_s TTD_b TTD_s Trades_b Trades_s  
EUR/MWh EUR/MWh GWh GWh GWh Mil. EUR Mil. EUR hh:mm:ss hh:mm:ss # # 
50HZ 34.38 34.80 120748 125113 -4365 4.21 4.28 05:05:48 05:00:47 10619 10616 
AMP 32.11 31.78 1899349 1744098 155251 60.41 55.02 05:27:03 05:08:19 110295 100693 
BE 46.80 45.61 1264393 1608779 -344386 62.77 78.71 05:59:16 06:24:29 40709 57473 
DK1 31.82 28.87 2563435 4215221 -1651786 82.12 123.75 05:28:44 06:35:58 126326 176458 
DK2 33.59 33.07 2789468 1672167 1117301 91.32 54.72 06:35:20 05:46:41 109928 80604 
EE 38.97 36.28 723744 339660 384084 28.59 12.78 05:52:51 05:05:39 55983 34500 
FI 33.70 34.79 4260039 4615976 -355937 143.33 160.12 05:05:34 04:41:40 435067 446539 
KT 36.43 34.57 2714654 2377515 337139 98.50 84.71 04:34:50 04:08:32 117253 100101 
LT 44.96 45.43 505530 475487 30043 21.16 22.52 10:01:08 10:59:58 37125 43809 
LV 40.46 36.66 79111 353441 -274330 3.23 14.17 06:36:30 06:19:19 13630 32482 
NL 43.34 43.63 2285611 1763362 522249 103.09 81.49 05:52:19 05:11:32 84784 64503 
NO1 26.02 29.32 177565 248727 -71162 4.25 7.19 10:52:47 10:24:03 10764 13535 
NO2 24.99 28.54 549507 573333 -23826 13.62 15.00 08:32:50 09:20:29 22970 26488 
NO3 29.05 30.04 196861 345113 -148252 5.69 10.01 08:18:13 07:21:25 13202 30887 
NO4 30.29 30.86 106337 267804 -161467 3.11 8.21 09:19:16 08:09:29 6020 15179 
NO5 24.73 26.91 320203 382362 -62159 7.63 9.94 10:32:00 10:25:33 10582 14214 
SE1 28.18 29.03 1701169 1841511 -140342 48.22 52.44 07:02:59 07:21:18 68266 75495 
SE2 27.68 29.22 2874786 3233059 -358273 78.96 94.37 06:18:58 06:32:17 173863 182255 
SE3 29.60 30.86 5133280 4446274 687006 151.65 136.23 06:23:44 06:27:34 271213 240506 
SE4 31.91 29.86 890788 583210 307579 29.58 17.61 06:09:48 05:33:47 62579 42669 
TBW 35.10 34.28 16803 17663 -860 0.56 0.61 03:38:09 03:30:03 744 730 
TTG 30.84 29.86 978554 922059 56495 29.15 27.28 05:34:10 05:21:33 63597 55783 
Total 33.03 33.07 32151933 32151933 0 1071.15 1071.15 06:47:23 06:37:45 1845519 1845519 
Note: _b and _s indices refer to buying and selling zone perspective, respectively. VWAP refers to volume weighted average price of Elbas trades; Tot Volume is the sum of volume 
traded on Elbas, and Net Volume is the difference between buying and selling volume per area, negative (-) implying net export and positive (+) net import; Turnover is the sum of 
quantity*price of Elbas trades; TTD refers to the average time-to-maturity of a contract from its purchase to delivery time; Trades refers to the total number of trades. 
 
   
Table 8 Results of the vector autoregression models 
 Panel (a) 
Variables SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 
 DA-ID DA-RP ID-RP DA-ID DA-RP ID-RP DA-ID DA-RP ID-RP DA-ID DA-RP ID-RP 
Congestion -0.086 -0.201 -0.136 -0.085 -0.220 -0.122 -0.042 -0.221 -0.232 0.147* -0.041 -0.216 
 -0.069 -0.350 -0.354 -0.067 -0.350 -0.350 -0.069 -0.354 -0.356 -0.083 -0.389 -0.391 
Weekend -0.024 -0.258 -0.240 0.018 -0.150 -0.201 0.026 -0.032 -0.092 -0.032 0.168 0.224 
 -0.040 -0.201 -0.204 -0.039 -0.202 -0.202 -0.040 -0.204 -0.205 -0.047 -0.223 -0.224 
Wind ramp 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
Hydro dev. NO 0.005 0.015 0.007 0.006 -0.001 -0.013 0.005 0.012 -0.001 0.003 -0.008 -0.015 
 -0.004 -0.021 -0.021 -0.004 -0.022 -0.022 -0.004 -0.021 -0.022 -0.005 -0.023 -0.024 
Hydro dev. SWE -0.007** -0.015 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.006* -0.036** -0.031* -0.003 -0.026 -0.027 
 -0.003 -0.016 -0.016 -0.003 -0.018 -0.018 -0.003 -0.017 -0.017 -0.004 -0.018 -0.018 
Hydro dev. FI -0.008* -0.015 -0.003 -0.007* -0.016 -0.004 -0.005 -0.011 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.005 
 -0.004 -0.020 -0.020 -0.004 -0.020 -0.020 -0.004 -0.020 -0.020 -0.005 -0.022 -0.023 
Hour 0-22, ref. 24 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Week 2-52, ref. 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
DA-ID, L.1-24,48 Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N 
DA-RP, L.1-24,48 N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N 
ID-RP, L.1-24,48 N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Wind error, L.1-24,48 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Demand error, L.1-24,48 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LL -64166 -106585 -106894 -63508 -106572 -106605 -64147 -106905 -107058 -68848 -109237 -109391 
RMSE 2.835 14.39 14.57 2.764 14.39 14.41 2.833 14.57 14.66 3.392 15.93 16.03 
R-sq 0.505 0.211 0.184 0.454 0.215 0.175 0.557 0.330 0.288 0.352 0.350 0.324 
Parameters 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Observations 26,106 26,107 26,108 26,106 26,106 26,106 26,106 26,106 26,106 26,106 26,106 26,106 
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 Panel (b)    
  FI DK1 DK2    
  DA-ID DA-RP ID-RP DA-ID DA-RP ID-RP DA-ID DA-RP ID-RP    
Congestion 0.012 -0.040 -0.144 -0.049 -0.384 -0.518*** -0.040 -0.549* -0.566**    
 -0.108 -0.811 -0.804 -0.196 -0.272 -0.181 -0.067 -0.282 -0.286    
Weekend -0.028 0.647 0.803* -0.108 -0.009 0.138 0.004 0.278* 0.310*    
 -0.061 -0.462 -0.458 -0.115 -0.159 -0.106 -0.040 -0.167 -0.169    
Wind ramp -0.002** -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.010*** 0.009***    
 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002    
Hydro dev. NO -0.015** -0.028 0.012 0.016 0.027 0.013 0.004 -0.003 -0.010    
 -0.007 -0.050 -0.049 -0.013 -0.018 -0.012 -0.004 -0.019 -0.019    
Hydro dev. SWE 0.006 -0.051 -0.078** 0.000 -0.017 -0.021** -0.008** -0.040** -0.036**    
 -0.005 -0.038 -0.038 -0.011 -0.016 -0.010 -0.004 -0.016 -0.017    
Hydro dev. FI 0.005 -0.060 -0.088* -0.007 0.002 0.012 0.008** 0.0271* 0.021    
 -0.006 -0.046 -0.045 -0.011 -0.015 -0.010 -0.004 -0.016 -0.016    
Hour 0-22, ref. 24 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y    
Week 2-52, ref. 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y    
DA-ID, L.1-24,48 Y N N Y N N Y N N    
DA-RP, L.1-24,48 N Y N N Y N N Y N    
ID-RP, L.1-24,48 N N Y N N Y N N Y    
Wind error, L.1-24,48 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y    
Demand error, L.1-24,48 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y    
LL -76726 -130151 -129928 -164958 -179181 -161362 -118668 -181425 -182000    
RMSE 4.406 33.16 32.89 10.66 14.78 9.819 3.676 15.48 15.69    
R-sq 0.567 0.236 0.206 0.730 0.627 0.385 0.359 0.378 0.333    
Parameters 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156    
Observations 26,467 26,468 26,469 43,594 43,594 43,594 43,646 43,647 43,648    
Note: The table shows coefficients, t-statistics, and model summary statistics based on the vector autoregression model specified in section 
V. Significance levels are displayed as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
   
 
 
Figure 13 Summary of price levels by delivery hour, 2013-2017 
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Figure 14 Summary of price spreads by delivery hour, 2013-2017 
 
 
